D. Scott Elliff ~it looks as if you fell off the planet, played a video in both English and Spanish, explaining the process and/or methodology for ...

the actions and demeanor of prosecuting attorney Melissa Daylong.

All students prosecuted in JP Courts and/or punished on the Federally Funded CCISD taxpayers tab should be punished by only one not both.

A child suspended and subsequently charged in court is double jeopardy and violates federal law.


Thank you,

CCISD TAXPAYER ASSOCIATION

RE: [republic of texas] New comment on DEAR PUBLIC POLICY MAKERS, JP COURTS HAVE GROWN WA....‏

Dear Sandra,

The "legally trained" prosecutor is obligated to provide you all material and information , including evidence , in advance of trial pursuant to to Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 and the case law, including Brady v Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and Giglio V United States, 405 U.S. 150(1972).

If their was a need for a psyche eval. the statement "kids like you wind up in jail" is biased,discrimination and stereotyping by a an officer of the court that is legally trained and not qualified to predict what a student will or will not do.

I am sorry to say this is common practice in the JP courts of Texas.

But i do know that if there is a chance your child will be incarcerated the sixth amendment to the U.S. Constitution requires an attorney be appointed to represent the defendant.

The practice of Texas public Schools pushing students into the "school to prison pipeline" is disgusting and failing to educate them is the goal.

If you are not legally trained, I suggest you do so quickly.

The google and internet have a wealth of info on this subject.

Good luck and may you always educate yourself and yours because you lose your rights if you do not assert them.

Speak up, talk to other parent in your situation, I promise you will not have to look far.

LeeAnn Haley
Kenedeno & Associates

P.S. Look at ~gritsforbreakfast.blogspot.com

The people of texas are out there that have gone through this same crap.



Date: Wed, 2 Apr 2008 15:11:59 -0700
From: sandratribble@gmail.com
To: kenedeno@gmail.com
Subject: [republic of texas] New comment on DEAR PUBLIC POLICY MAKERS, JP COURTS HAVE GROWN WA....

sandra has left a new comment on your post "DEAR PUBLIC POLICY MAKERS, JP COURTS HAVE GROWN WA...":

The methodology for the “Diversion Agreement” as it affected my son and I in the charges of failure to attend school, In the justice Court, Precinct 8, position2 Cause No. CR82C0144252 After becoming aware of my son’s truant behavior, and determining the cause, and trying continually to remedy the situation in conjunction with my son’s principal, we finally had our initial day in court. Upon entering the courtroom, we were told to complete a form and produce identification. Then the court played a video in both English and Spanish, explaining the process minimally. My son and are were the 1st defendants called. We approached the table that had called us, and sat down. There were four individuals at the table, none of which identified or introduced themselves to my son or myself. I understand my son and I were the defendants in the action, but as it was a pretrial. Cara Hernandez, I assume as the diversion agreement was stamped with her name, immediately started questioning my son in a tone similar to the actions and demeanor of prosecuting attorney Kelly Siegler, but again without the introduction. My son answered her questions, but when Mrs. Hernandez summed up her interpretation of what my son had said, she repeatedly said my son was blaming his truant behavior on everyone else. Upon direct questioning as to why he had been repeatedly absent, my son said he had an issue with a teacher, even brought up a verbal attack from the teacher directed at my son and other students. Mrs. Hernandez in her questioning of my son stated, it looks as if you fell off the planet, but it seems your back. Mrs Hernandez also stated that she hated to put children like my son in jail as he had no prior history, but kids like him almost always end up in jail, where as students that are always in court are smart enough to do just enough to stay out of jail. A man at the table handed me a piece of paper and requested I get Mike in counseling, I responded that Mike is already being seen by a counselor. He then asks if Mike had ever had a psychological assessment. I answered, “Not that I’m aware of.” He explained his name and number was written on the paper, and requested that I have a psychological assessment of my son done at Depelchin Children’s center. I contacted Depechin, to schedule a psychological assessment, explaining it had been court ordered thru a diversion agreement at my son’s court hearing in regards to truancy. The representative over the phone, seemed a little perplexed, she questioned, what sort of psychological assessment do you need? The paper I had been given was dated 9/7/06 from a web page that is no longer available, http://www.depelchin.org/display.php/tid/11.html. In spite of the message I left for Raul Gaona, yesterday after my conversation with the Depelchin representative, I have not received a return call. The Depelchin representative did volunteer that the Doctors used by Depelchin for psychological assessments were not accredited with any insurance. I contacted my sons’ therapist that works in conjunction with a licensed Psychiatrist, I explained what the court had ordered, a psychological assessment. The therapist asked what kind, rudimentary psychological assessment, personality psychological assessment, projection psychological assessment, or intelligence psychological assessment? After I explained it only said psychological assessment, my sons therapist explained, it would not be covered by insurance unless it was medically necessary. He also concluded if it became medically necessary in the course of therapy, it would be a covered testing. In the signed diversion agreement, we agreed to continue therapy, so I don’t understand the necessity of having a psychological assessment that has yet to be deemed a medical necessity. Obviously in following the court order of continued therapy, one would follow the recommendations of a mental health authority. My question to Raul Gaona would be in you minimal participation in the diversion agreement yesterday, do you think your question as to weather or not I had insurance indicated to me, along with the paper with hand written…No Contract No Evolv- Insurance, Medicaid, chips…that the psychological assessment would be covered to the extent my insurance allowed ? I am appalled by the actions and manipulation of words used by Cara Hernandez, and intentional mis-information indicated by Mr. Gaona. In the prosecutions discussion of perhaps getting a mentor, to mentor my child in how to cross the intersection of Bay Area Blvd(4 lanes of traffic), and Fm 528(5lanes), 15 minutes before sunrise, to get too tutorials(with an abusive teacher)on time, the prosecutor and all participants at the table should be mentored on the common courtesy of introducing oneself before questioning them or listening to their questioning.
To the assumed School district representative, had you recently been in contact with the principal at my son’s school perhaps you would have been aware of the mitigating circumstances regarding my son’s absences. The prosecutor implied my son had made up the conflict between the teacher and my son, as a representative of the school district, I would expect at least some acknowledgement of the said issue. The principal at my son’s school has obviously concluded, there was a real or perceived issue between my son and the teacher, as her actions allowing my child to remain in the student center during that teacher’s period, and has finally allowed my son to transfer out of that teacher’s class. Also, I do not understand which absences were used to charge my son with failure to attend school, as none accompanied the complaint. Under Section 25.0951 of the Texas Education Code If the school district chooses to file the charge of “failure to attend school” against the student, it must do so within ten (10) school days of the student’s 10th absence. The court must dismiss charges that are not filed within 10 school days of the student’s 10th absence.



Posted by sandra to republic of texas at 3:11 PM

I find it ironic that a counsel get paid for an alleged conscientious examination ......that anders voucher is requesedt

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IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS AP-74,996 Ex parte BRIAN KEITH OWENS, Applicant Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus from Tyler County Womack, J., filed a concurring opinion in which Cochran, J., joined. The Court says, ante at 8, "We fail to perceive any principled reason that our holding in Wilson should not apply equally to an appellant whose attorney files an Anders brief." I believe there is a principled reason. More important than that reason are the facts that the Wilson/Axel requirement is based on a fallacy, and it doesn't work. The Principled Reason. The principled reason that the holding in Wilson (1) should not apply when counsel files an Anders brief is that such an attorney must sever the attorney-client relationship. The entire reason for the Anders procedure is counsel's ethical obligation not to assert frivolous claims. (2) As the Anders opinion says: Of course, if counsel finds his case to be wholly frivolous, after a conscientious examination of it, he should so advise the court and request permission to withdraw. That request must, however, be accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal. A copy of counsel's brief should be furnished the indigent and time allowed him to raise any points that he chooses; the court -- not counsel -- then proceeds, after a full examination of all the proceedings, to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous. If it so finds it may grant counsel's request to withdraw and dismiss the appeal insofar as federal requirements are concerned, or proceed to a decision on the merits, if state law so requires. On the other hand, if it finds any of the legal points arguable on their merits (and therefore not frivolous) it must, prior to decision, afford the indigent the assistance of counsel to argue the appeal. (3) Whether he was correct or incorrect about there being no arguable grounds, the lawyer who files an Anders brief is leaving the case. This distinguishes the appellate lawyer from the trial lawyer. Even when the trial has ended in the conviction of the defendant, trial counsel's duty extends to advising him whether to appeal, as we held in Ex parte Axel: Precise obligations are laid out in ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Justice ("Standards"), The Defense Function, Part VIII. After Conviction. After sentencing, the lawyer explains to defendant "meaning and consequences" of the judgment and "his right to appeal." He expresses his professional opinion as to "meritorious grounds for appeal and as to probable results of an appeal," as well as its "advantages and disadvantages." "The decision whether to appeal must be the defendant's …." The lawyer "should take whatever steps are necessary to protect the defendant's right of appeal." § 8.2 Appeal, Standards, at 135. (4) The appellate counsel who has filed an Anders brief because he has found the appeal to be wholly frivolous could not continue to give advice to the client about whether to seek further review. So there is a principled distinction here, which the Wilson Court ignored when it extended to all appellate counsel the same duty it imposed on all trial counsel in Axel. The Axel Fallacy. I find irony in this because, in my view, the Axel Court's reasoning was clearly wrong when it gave trial counsel, and only trial counsel, the duty to advise the defendant how to perfect an appeal without a lawyer. The reasoning in Axel was, "Informing a defendant of his right to appeal is part and parcel of also further advising him along lines of the Standards, ante, in order to make a decision whether to take an appeal. Surely a judge is precluded from giving that kind of advice, and who better than an attorney who tried the case is qualified to assay and advise his client of probabilities of error?" (5) It is true that, if a defense lawyer advises a defendant whether to appeal, the defendant will get the idea that there is such a thing as an appeal. And it is true that a judge is precluded from advising a defendant whether to appeal. But a judge is not precluded from telling every convicted defendant that he has a right of appeal and that to have an appeal he must file written notice of appeal within thirty days. No other jurisdiction that I know of has committed the fallacy of giving trial counsel, rather than the trial court, the responsibility to inform a defendant of the right to appeal and the procedures for appealing. Perhaps other jurisdictions considered that having this done by thousands of lawyers in confidential, off-the-record meetings with clients would be less reliable than having it done by the judge in open court, on the record. (6) If there was any justification for doing that in Axel, there was none for doing it in Wilson. It Doesn't Work. Not a decision day passes without this court's granting habeas corpus relief, in the form of out-of-time appeals or petitions for discretionary review, to convicted defendants whose counsel failed to carry out the responsibilities that the Court gave them in Axel and Wilson. We should, and we can, have a better method of informing defendants of their rights and duties in the appellate process. FILED: SEPTEMBER 13, 2006 PUBLISH 1. Ex parte Wilson, 956 S.W.2d 25 (Tex. Cr. App. 1997). 2. "A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless the lawyer reasonably believes that there is a basis for doing so that it not frivolous." Tex. Disciplinary R. Prof'l Conduct 3.01. 3. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 4. 757 S.W.2d 369, 373 (Tex. Cr. App. 1988). 5. 757 S.W.2d, at 373. 6. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(j) (requiring the court to advise the defendant of any right to appeal, and requiring the clerk to immediately prepare and file a notice of appeal on the defendant's behalf if the defendant so requests).