D. Scott Elliff ~it looks as if you fell off the planet, played a video in both English and Spanish, explaining the process and/or methodology for ...

the actions and demeanor of prosecuting attorney Melissa Daylong.

All students prosecuted in JP Courts and/or punished on the Federally Funded CCISD taxpayers tab should be punished by only one not both.

A child suspended and subsequently charged in court is double jeopardy and violates federal law.


Thank you,

CCISD TAXPAYER ASSOCIATION

RE: [republic of texas] New comment on DEAR PUBLIC POLICY MAKERS, JP COURTS HAVE GROWN WA....‏

Dear Sandra,

The "legally trained" prosecutor is obligated to provide you all material and information , including evidence , in advance of trial pursuant to to Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 and the case law, including Brady v Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and Giglio V United States, 405 U.S. 150(1972).

If their was a need for a psyche eval. the statement "kids like you wind up in jail" is biased,discrimination and stereotyping by a an officer of the court that is legally trained and not qualified to predict what a student will or will not do.

I am sorry to say this is common practice in the JP courts of Texas.

But i do know that if there is a chance your child will be incarcerated the sixth amendment to the U.S. Constitution requires an attorney be appointed to represent the defendant.

The practice of Texas public Schools pushing students into the "school to prison pipeline" is disgusting and failing to educate them is the goal.

If you are not legally trained, I suggest you do so quickly.

The google and internet have a wealth of info on this subject.

Good luck and may you always educate yourself and yours because you lose your rights if you do not assert them.

Speak up, talk to other parent in your situation, I promise you will not have to look far.

LeeAnn Haley
Kenedeno & Associates

P.S. Look at ~gritsforbreakfast.blogspot.com

The people of texas are out there that have gone through this same crap.



Date: Wed, 2 Apr 2008 15:11:59 -0700
From: sandratribble@gmail.com
To: kenedeno@gmail.com
Subject: [republic of texas] New comment on DEAR PUBLIC POLICY MAKERS, JP COURTS HAVE GROWN WA....

sandra has left a new comment on your post "DEAR PUBLIC POLICY MAKERS, JP COURTS HAVE GROWN WA...":

The methodology for the “Diversion Agreement” as it affected my son and I in the charges of failure to attend school, In the justice Court, Precinct 8, position2 Cause No. CR82C0144252 After becoming aware of my son’s truant behavior, and determining the cause, and trying continually to remedy the situation in conjunction with my son’s principal, we finally had our initial day in court. Upon entering the courtroom, we were told to complete a form and produce identification. Then the court played a video in both English and Spanish, explaining the process minimally. My son and are were the 1st defendants called. We approached the table that had called us, and sat down. There were four individuals at the table, none of which identified or introduced themselves to my son or myself. I understand my son and I were the defendants in the action, but as it was a pretrial. Cara Hernandez, I assume as the diversion agreement was stamped with her name, immediately started questioning my son in a tone similar to the actions and demeanor of prosecuting attorney Kelly Siegler, but again without the introduction. My son answered her questions, but when Mrs. Hernandez summed up her interpretation of what my son had said, she repeatedly said my son was blaming his truant behavior on everyone else. Upon direct questioning as to why he had been repeatedly absent, my son said he had an issue with a teacher, even brought up a verbal attack from the teacher directed at my son and other students. Mrs. Hernandez in her questioning of my son stated, it looks as if you fell off the planet, but it seems your back. Mrs Hernandez also stated that she hated to put children like my son in jail as he had no prior history, but kids like him almost always end up in jail, where as students that are always in court are smart enough to do just enough to stay out of jail. A man at the table handed me a piece of paper and requested I get Mike in counseling, I responded that Mike is already being seen by a counselor. He then asks if Mike had ever had a psychological assessment. I answered, “Not that I’m aware of.” He explained his name and number was written on the paper, and requested that I have a psychological assessment of my son done at Depelchin Children’s center. I contacted Depechin, to schedule a psychological assessment, explaining it had been court ordered thru a diversion agreement at my son’s court hearing in regards to truancy. The representative over the phone, seemed a little perplexed, she questioned, what sort of psychological assessment do you need? The paper I had been given was dated 9/7/06 from a web page that is no longer available, http://www.depelchin.org/display.php/tid/11.html. In spite of the message I left for Raul Gaona, yesterday after my conversation with the Depelchin representative, I have not received a return call. The Depelchin representative did volunteer that the Doctors used by Depelchin for psychological assessments were not accredited with any insurance. I contacted my sons’ therapist that works in conjunction with a licensed Psychiatrist, I explained what the court had ordered, a psychological assessment. The therapist asked what kind, rudimentary psychological assessment, personality psychological assessment, projection psychological assessment, or intelligence psychological assessment? After I explained it only said psychological assessment, my sons therapist explained, it would not be covered by insurance unless it was medically necessary. He also concluded if it became medically necessary in the course of therapy, it would be a covered testing. In the signed diversion agreement, we agreed to continue therapy, so I don’t understand the necessity of having a psychological assessment that has yet to be deemed a medical necessity. Obviously in following the court order of continued therapy, one would follow the recommendations of a mental health authority. My question to Raul Gaona would be in you minimal participation in the diversion agreement yesterday, do you think your question as to weather or not I had insurance indicated to me, along with the paper with hand written…No Contract No Evolv- Insurance, Medicaid, chips…that the psychological assessment would be covered to the extent my insurance allowed ? I am appalled by the actions and manipulation of words used by Cara Hernandez, and intentional mis-information indicated by Mr. Gaona. In the prosecutions discussion of perhaps getting a mentor, to mentor my child in how to cross the intersection of Bay Area Blvd(4 lanes of traffic), and Fm 528(5lanes), 15 minutes before sunrise, to get too tutorials(with an abusive teacher)on time, the prosecutor and all participants at the table should be mentored on the common courtesy of introducing oneself before questioning them or listening to their questioning.
To the assumed School district representative, had you recently been in contact with the principal at my son’s school perhaps you would have been aware of the mitigating circumstances regarding my son’s absences. The prosecutor implied my son had made up the conflict between the teacher and my son, as a representative of the school district, I would expect at least some acknowledgement of the said issue. The principal at my son’s school has obviously concluded, there was a real or perceived issue between my son and the teacher, as her actions allowing my child to remain in the student center during that teacher’s period, and has finally allowed my son to transfer out of that teacher’s class. Also, I do not understand which absences were used to charge my son with failure to attend school, as none accompanied the complaint. Under Section 25.0951 of the Texas Education Code If the school district chooses to file the charge of “failure to attend school” against the student, it must do so within ten (10) school days of the student’s 10th absence. The court must dismiss charges that are not filed within 10 school days of the student’s 10th absence.



Posted by sandra to republic of texas at 3:11 PM

All those TYC "clients" fund "machine" and by golly they will be tried as adults or denied 6th amendment, but Delay will get paid with out Delay!

Chisme is not verdad, but it would be prudent to tell all of you Medicaid coverage is bankrolled by the government to the tune of $600 dollars per recipient /per month.

Now you do the math.

Right John?

Malicious Prosecutor.....your damn right it is personal!

http://stxv.blogspot.com/

in a civil case, we may take as true facts stated in an appellant's brief that are not contradicted by the appellee, this is a criminal case. Fair? No

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NUMBER 13-06-494-CR


COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS


CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

DAVID C. MATTHEWS, Appellant,


v.


THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

On appeal from the County Court at Law of Lavaca County, Texas.

MEMORANDUM OPINION


Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Benavides, and Vela

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides


Appellant David Matthews, appearing pro se, appeals his conviction for failure to reduce his speed while passing an authorized emergency vehicle. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 545.157 (Vernon Supp. 2006). After a jury trial, Matthews was fined $100.00, assessed court costs of $224.00, and assessed a transaction fee of $2.00. Matthews contends (1) that the prosecutor's closing argument conclusively demonstrates that he could not have slowed down to the speed required by law, and (2) that the prosecutor committed misconduct by prosecuting Matthews with knowledge of these "extenuating circumstances" surrounding his alleged traffic violation. We affirm.

I. Background

On March 19, 2006, Matthews was ticketed for failure to reduce his speed while passing an emergency vehicle. The traffic citation appears in the record, and it states that Matthews was traveling at a speed of sixty miles per hour in a seventy mile per hour zone while passing the emergency vehicle. (1)

Matthews contested the traffic citation in the Justice Court of Lavaca County. After a non-jury trial, the justice court found Matthews guilty and assessed a fine of $196.00. Matthews appealed that decision to the County Court of Lavaca County. There, he pleaded not guilty and requested a jury trial. A jury of six was empaneled, and the case was tried on August 28, 2006.

The jury charge and verdict appear in the clerk's record. The jury found Matthews guilty and assessed a fine of $100.00 plus court costs. The reporter's record, however, consists of only a small portion of the trial-specifically, it includes only the Lavaca County Attorney's closing argument.

The Lavaca County Attorney argued that the evidence showed that Matthews was the driver of a vehicle on public highway US 77 in Lavaca County. She argued that Matthews failed to reduce his speed while passing a state trooper's parked emergency vehicle. The state trooper, Corporal Matthew Southall, had his emergency lights on and was issuing a traffic ticket to another driver. The county attorney argued that according to Southall's testimony, Matthews was traveling at sixty miles per hour where the posted speed limit was seventy miles per hour.

The portion of the transcript that Matthews relies on for his appeal is as follows:

[The radar] hit Mr. Matthews. He said 60. He said 58 for the truck that was behind him. Common sense tells you Mr. Matthews is in front, truck's in back. Truck's going 58. Mr. Matthews has to be going faster than 58. Mr. Matthews wants you to believe that the fact - if the radar - here's Corporal Southall's car, if the radar hits him and he is already passing by it's not a legitimate offense. Yes, it is. And the corporal said it is. It is because there is no way, physically, when Mr. Matthews is approaching this stationary emergency vehicle, that he could have been going 50 miles an hour. That is what the corporal testified to. . . . Corporal said there's no way that Mr. Matthews was ever going 50 miles-an-hour when he was passing the stationary emergency vehicle. It's that simple.


After his conviction, Matthews filed a pro se brief with this Court. The State has not filed a brief.

II. Analysis


Matthews's issue apparently revolves around whether the county attorney admitted a significant fact during her closing argument. He asserts that the county attorney

[i]n her closing argument . . . pointed out that the vehicle following mine was traveling at 58 mph and therefore I could not have slowed down to 50 mph traveling through the emergency scene. . . . I submit that having been fully aware of these extenuating circumstances [the county attorney] still decided to proceed to trial which in turn means that this was not a good faith prosecution. In fact, deciding to proceed against an individual in full knowledge of their innocence constitutes malicious prosecution.


Matthews misconstrues the county attorney's closing argument. Nowhere in the transcript does the county attorney ever say that it was impossible for Matthews to slow down to an appropriate speed while passing the emergency vehicle. Rather, the county attorney was attempting to counter Matthews's argument that, although the radar registered him as traveling at sixty miles per hour after he had already passed the emergency vehicle, he was actually traveling fifty miles per hour while passing.

The county attorney merely stated that it was impossible that Matthews was traveling at fifty miles per hour when he passed the trooper. Her argument was that Matthews must have been going faster because the car immediately behind him was traveling at fifty-eight miles per hour when it passed. Nothing in this statement indicates that Matthews was unable to apply his brakes and reduce his speed, as Matthews contends. If such evidence was presented by Matthews at trial, we have no knowledge of it because the record is incomplete.

Although in a civil case, we may take as true facts stated in an appellant's brief that are not contradicted by the appellee, this is a criminal case. Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(f). Even so, we are not authorized to ignore the record on appeal and reverse a lower court based on statements by the appellant that are directly contradicted by the record. The record simply does not support Matthews's argument.

Moreover, the record does not reveal any objection to the allegedly inappropriate prosecution and closing argument; no motion for a mistrial related to prosecutorial misconduct was filed. Accordingly, Matthews's two complaints were not preserved for review. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1.

Finally, even had Matthews preserved error, his brief is entirely devoid of citations to legal authority. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(h). Although we recognize that pro se litigants are entitled to greater leniency, they are not exempt from the rules of procedure. Wheeler v. Green, 157 S.W.3d 439, 444 (Tex. 2005). We cannot remedy deficiencies in a litigant's brief or provide an adequate record when none is presented by the appellant. Green v. Kaposta, 152 S.W.3d 839, 841 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.). Both of Matthews's issues are overruled.

III. Conclusion

Finding that Matthews has not presented anything for our review, we affirm the trial court's judgment of conviction.


__________________________

GINA M. BENAVIDES

Justice


Do not publish.

See Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

Memorandum Opinion delivered and

filed this the 23rd day of August, 2007.

1. Texas Transportation Code section 545.157(a) provides:


(a) On approaching a stationary authorized emergency vehicle using visual signals that meet the requirements of Sections 547.305 and 547.702, an operator, unless otherwise directed by a police officer, shall:

(1) vacate the lane closest to the emergency vehicle when driving on a
highway with two or more lanes traveling in the direction of the
emergency vehicle; or


(2) slow to a speed not to exceed:

(A) 20 miles per hour less than the posted speed limit when the
posted speed limit is 25 miles per hour or more; or

(B) five miles per hour when the posted speed limit is less than 25
miles per hour.