Breach of confidence
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The tort of breach of confidence, is a common law tort that protects private information that is conveyed in confidence. A claim for breach of confidence typically requires the information to be of a confidential nature, which was communicated in confidence, and was disclosed to the detriment of the claimant.
Establishing breach of confidentiality depends on proving the existence and breach of a duty of confidentiality. Courts in the US look at the nature of the relationship between the parties. Most commonly, breach of confidentiality applies to the patient-physician relationship but it can also apply to relationships involving banks, hospitals, insurance companies.
"Evidence willfully withheld from disclosure under a discovery order should be excluded from evidence." (5) When reviewing a trial judge's decision to admit or exclude evidence, No wonder we are embarrassed,exclude evidence legally then the opine is evidence of the the truth of the matter asserted was exculpatory.
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Sunday, November 25, 2007
Saturday, November 17, 2007
Texas court of Criminal appealsdid not take any action on this motion.......
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NUMBER 13-02-439-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI-EDINBURG
IN RE: JESSICA GARCIA
On Petition for Writ of Mandamus
O P I N I O N
Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Dorsey and Rodriguez
Opinion by Chief Justice Valdez
Relator, Jessica Garcia, has filed a petition for writ of mandamus complaining that the trial court abused its discretion in reinstating the lawsuit of the real party in interest, Virginia Carroll-Boyd. We conditionally grant relief.
Background
The trial court dismissed a personal injury case for want of prosecution. Thirteen days later, the plaintiff filed an unverified motion for new trial and to reinstate, alleging merely that:
The Plaintiff requests that her case be reinstated and that she be granted a new trial. The Plaintiff=s attorney was in Austin, Texas on February 22, 2002, and desires to proceed . . . .
The trial court did not take any action on this motion. One hundred and eight days after the order of dismissal was entered, the plaintiff=s attorney filed an affidavit stating that he Areceived no Notice of this case being placed on the Dismissal Docket or of the hearing scheduled for February 22, 2002 . . . .@ The affidavit provided that the attorney had moved his law office to Austin in October of 2001, and had notified the Nueces County District Clerk regarding his change of address. Thus, the attorney alleged that the cause was dismissed without proper notice, and that the plaintiff wished to pursue her case. The trial court granted the motion to reinstate and motion for new trial the day after this affidavit was filed. The defendants in this case have filed a petition for mandamus on grounds that the trial court acted without jurisdiction in granting the motion to reinstate and for a new trial.
Mandamus is Proper Remedy
If the trial court erroneously reinstates a case after it loses jurisdiction, the ruling can be challenged by mandamus. Estate of Howley v. Haberman, 878 S.W.2d 139, 140 (Tex. 1994); see, e.g., City of McAllen v. Ramirez, 875 S.W.2d 702, 704 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 1994, orig. proceeding).
Analysis
A trial court has plenary power to reinstate a case within thirty days of dismissal for want of prosecution. Tex. R. Civ. P. 165(a)(3), (4); Neese v. Wray, 893 S.W.2d 169, 170 (Tex. App.BHouston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ). A verified motion to reinstate filed within thirty days of dismissal extends plenary power for the same amount of time as would a motion for new trial. Tex. R. Civ. P. 165(a)(3), (4); McConnell v. May, 800 S.W.2d 194, 194 (Tex. 1990) (orig. proceeding).
In this case, the plaintiff=s motion to reinstate was not verified and did not include affidavits. An unverified motion is a nullity and does not extend the trial court=s plenary jurisdiction or the deadlines for perfecting an appeal. McConnell, 800 S.W.2d at 194. Therefore, the trial court=s plenary jurisdiction expired because the plaintiff did not file a verified motion within thirty days after the order of dismissal. Id. Accordingly, the trial court had no authority to grant the reinstatement motion after March 25, 2002, thirty days after the February 22, 2002, dismissal (the thirtieth day falls on a weekend).
We cannot consider the late-filed affidavit as an amended motion to reinstate because any amended motion was also required to be filed within thirty days of the date the dismissal order was signed. See Mandujano v. Oliva, 755 S.W.2d 512, 514 (Tex. App.BSan Antonio 1988, writ denied).
We cannot treat the plaintiff=s AMotion for a New Trial and to Reinstate@ as a motion for new trial, which is not required to be verified to extend plenary power. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 329(b) (no verification requirement for a motion for new trial). We cannot construe the motion to reinstate as one for a new trial even though it is labeled as such; rather, we look at the substance of the motion, which is one to reinstate. City of McAllen v. Ramirez, 875 S.W.2d 702, 704-05 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 1994, no writ) (a litigant may not circumvent the verification requirements of rule 165(a)(3) by labeling a motion for reinstatement as a motion for new trial); see State Bar of Tex. v. Heard, 603 S.W.2d 829, 833 (Tex. 1980) (orig. proceeding).
Therefore, the trial court=s jurisdiction expired thirty days after entry of the order of dismissal. Even if we were to somehow manage to construe the motion to reinstate as a motion for new trial, the trial court=s plenary jurisdiction had expired. The motion for reinstatement was overruled by operation of law because it was not decided within seventy-five days after the judgment was signed. Tex. R. Civ. P. 165(a)(3). The trial court had plenary power to reinstate the case until thirty days after any such timely filed motion was overruled. Id. May 8, 2002 was the seventy-fifth day after the order dismissing the case; June 7, 2002, was the thirtieth day after the motion to reinstate was overruled; and the reinstatement order was not entered until June 11, 2002.
Conclusion
We conclude that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to reinstate the case. We conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus. The writ will only issue if the trial court refuses to withdraw its order reinstating the case.
ROGELIO VALDEZ
Chief Justice
Publish.
Tex. R. App. P. 47.3.
Opinion delivered and filed
this 12th day of December, 2002.
NUMBER 13-02-439-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI-EDINBURG
IN RE: JESSICA GARCIA
On Petition for Writ of Mandamus
O P I N I O N
Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Dorsey and Rodriguez
Opinion by Chief Justice Valdez
Relator, Jessica Garcia, has filed a petition for writ of mandamus complaining that the trial court abused its discretion in reinstating the lawsuit of the real party in interest, Virginia Carroll-Boyd. We conditionally grant relief.
Background
The trial court dismissed a personal injury case for want of prosecution. Thirteen days later, the plaintiff filed an unverified motion for new trial and to reinstate, alleging merely that:
The Plaintiff requests that her case be reinstated and that she be granted a new trial. The Plaintiff=s attorney was in Austin, Texas on February 22, 2002, and desires to proceed . . . .
The trial court did not take any action on this motion. One hundred and eight days after the order of dismissal was entered, the plaintiff=s attorney filed an affidavit stating that he Areceived no Notice of this case being placed on the Dismissal Docket or of the hearing scheduled for February 22, 2002 . . . .@ The affidavit provided that the attorney had moved his law office to Austin in October of 2001, and had notified the Nueces County District Clerk regarding his change of address. Thus, the attorney alleged that the cause was dismissed without proper notice, and that the plaintiff wished to pursue her case. The trial court granted the motion to reinstate and motion for new trial the day after this affidavit was filed. The defendants in this case have filed a petition for mandamus on grounds that the trial court acted without jurisdiction in granting the motion to reinstate and for a new trial.
Mandamus is Proper Remedy
If the trial court erroneously reinstates a case after it loses jurisdiction, the ruling can be challenged by mandamus. Estate of Howley v. Haberman, 878 S.W.2d 139, 140 (Tex. 1994); see, e.g., City of McAllen v. Ramirez, 875 S.W.2d 702, 704 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 1994, orig. proceeding).
Analysis
A trial court has plenary power to reinstate a case within thirty days of dismissal for want of prosecution. Tex. R. Civ. P. 165(a)(3), (4); Neese v. Wray, 893 S.W.2d 169, 170 (Tex. App.BHouston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ). A verified motion to reinstate filed within thirty days of dismissal extends plenary power for the same amount of time as would a motion for new trial. Tex. R. Civ. P. 165(a)(3), (4); McConnell v. May, 800 S.W.2d 194, 194 (Tex. 1990) (orig. proceeding).
In this case, the plaintiff=s motion to reinstate was not verified and did not include affidavits. An unverified motion is a nullity and does not extend the trial court=s plenary jurisdiction or the deadlines for perfecting an appeal. McConnell, 800 S.W.2d at 194. Therefore, the trial court=s plenary jurisdiction expired because the plaintiff did not file a verified motion within thirty days after the order of dismissal. Id. Accordingly, the trial court had no authority to grant the reinstatement motion after March 25, 2002, thirty days after the February 22, 2002, dismissal (the thirtieth day falls on a weekend).
We cannot consider the late-filed affidavit as an amended motion to reinstate because any amended motion was also required to be filed within thirty days of the date the dismissal order was signed. See Mandujano v. Oliva, 755 S.W.2d 512, 514 (Tex. App.BSan Antonio 1988, writ denied).
We cannot treat the plaintiff=s AMotion for a New Trial and to Reinstate@ as a motion for new trial, which is not required to be verified to extend plenary power. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 329(b) (no verification requirement for a motion for new trial). We cannot construe the motion to reinstate as one for a new trial even though it is labeled as such; rather, we look at the substance of the motion, which is one to reinstate. City of McAllen v. Ramirez, 875 S.W.2d 702, 704-05 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 1994, no writ) (a litigant may not circumvent the verification requirements of rule 165(a)(3) by labeling a motion for reinstatement as a motion for new trial); see State Bar of Tex. v. Heard, 603 S.W.2d 829, 833 (Tex. 1980) (orig. proceeding).
Therefore, the trial court=s jurisdiction expired thirty days after entry of the order of dismissal. Even if we were to somehow manage to construe the motion to reinstate as a motion for new trial, the trial court=s plenary jurisdiction had expired. The motion for reinstatement was overruled by operation of law because it was not decided within seventy-five days after the judgment was signed. Tex. R. Civ. P. 165(a)(3). The trial court had plenary power to reinstate the case until thirty days after any such timely filed motion was overruled. Id. May 8, 2002 was the seventy-fifth day after the order dismissing the case; June 7, 2002, was the thirtieth day after the motion to reinstate was overruled; and the reinstatement order was not entered until June 11, 2002.
Conclusion
We conclude that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to reinstate the case. We conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus. The writ will only issue if the trial court refuses to withdraw its order reinstating the case.
ROGELIO VALDEZ
Chief Justice
Publish.
Tex. R. App. P. 47.3.
Opinion delivered and filed
this 12th day of December, 2002.
Wednesday, November 07, 2007
We find it particularly disingenuous that the State, after misleading the trial court about when the sixty-day deadline would run, and then promising
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NUMBER 13-05-00181-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant,
v.
ESTANISLADO MORIN, Appellee.
On appeal from the 275th District Court of Hidalgo County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Hinojosa, Rodriguez, and Garza
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Hinojosa
The State appeals from the trial court's order granting appellee Estanislado Morin's application for writ of habeas corpus and granting a new trial. (1) In three issues, the State contends the trial court (1) used the incorrect legal standard to evaluate appellee's newly-discovered evidence claim, (2) abused its discretion in granting his application for writ of habeas corpus based on newly-discovered evidence, and (3) failed to enter the habeas corpus order within the statutory time limit. We reverse and remand.
A. Factual & Procedural Background
A jury found appellee guilty of two counts of indecency with a child and assessed his punishment at five years' imprisonment and a $ 5,000 fine for each count. Because the jury recommended that the prison sentences and fines for both counts be suspended and that appellee be placed on community supervision, the trial court suspended the prison sentences and fines for both counts, and placed appellee on community supervision for five years for each count. (2) Subsequently, appellee was deported and complied with the terms of his community supervision by mail.
On October 10, 2003, appellee applied for a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus pursuant to article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, alleging (1) ineffective assistance of counsel and (2) newly-discovered evidence of innocence. In support of his newly-discovered evidence allegations, appellee attached an affidavit of the complaining witness, Veronica Salazar, (3) dated September 19, 2003, wherein she recanted her prior testimony. The State did not receive notice of the application until April 27, 2004, and filed a response on May 24, 2004. The State attached an affidavit, dated May 4, 2004, wherein Salazar recanted her September 19, 2003 recantation. The State also noted that appellee should have filed his post-conviction writ pursuant to article 11.072, instead of article 11.07. (4) See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 11.07, 11.072 (Vernon 2005).
On May 27, 2004, the trial court overruled appellee's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and ordered a hearing on appellee's issue regarding the newly-discovered evidence of innocence. That hearing was held on June 29, 2004, and Salazar testified about her conflicting affidavits. The proceedings were then recessed to July 16, 2004, so that appellee, who was absent because of his deportation, could be present.
The hearing resumed on July 16, 2004, without appellee, who waived his presence. Both sides discussed the sixty-day statutory deadline at great length, and several times the State told the trial court that it would waive the sixty-day deadline, if it could be waived. Both sides mistakenly told the court when they thought the sixty-day deadline would elapse. Salazar testified again regarding her affidavits, explaining that she was pressured by family members to execute the September 19, 2003 affidavit, and her testimony at trial was truthful. After the hearing, the trial court said that before it ruled, it wanted additional memorandums from both sides. On October 22, 2004, the trial court ruled that Salazar's credibility was a question for a jury, and orally granted appellee a new trial. A written order reflecting this ruling was signed on March 4, 2005.
B. Standard of Review
In reviewing a district court's decision to grant a habeas corpus petition, we review the application of legal standards de novo. Ex parte Peterson, 117 S.W.3d 804, 819 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). We afford almost total deference to the trial judge's determination of the historical facts supported by the record, especially when the fact findings are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. See Ex parte Martin, 6 S.W.3d 524, 526 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). However, "if the record will not support the trial judge's conclusions, then this Court may make contrary findings." See Ex parte Adams, 768 S.W.2d 281, 288 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
C. Discussion
In its third issue, the State contends the trial court erred by failing to enter its written order within the statutory deadline of sixty days. The State argues that because the order was not entered within the sixty-day period, the order is void and appellee's application was denied by operation of law. (5)
Article 11.072 of the code of criminal procedure provides that: "Not later than the 60th day after the day on which the State's answer is filed, the trial court shall enter a written order granting or denying the relief sought in the application." Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.072. Because the State's answer to appellee's application was filed on May 24, 2004, the 60th day was July 23, 2004.
Habeas corpus petitions are to be heard without delay. See Tex. Const. art. I, § 12; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art 11.07; Martin v. Hamlin, 25 S.W.3d 718, 719 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); McCree v. Hampton, 824 S.W.2d 578, 578-79 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). The proper remedy to a trial court's delay in ruling on a habeas corpus petition under article 11.072 is to file for a petition for a writ of mandamus from this Court. See Ex parte Hargett, 819 S.W.2d 866, 868 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). After a trial court's ruling on a habeas corpus petition, compliance with statutory deadlines becomes moot. See McCree, 824 S.W.2d at 579; see also Ex parte Kendrick, No. 01-95-00161-CR, 1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 3400, *2 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, pet. ref'd) (not designated for publication).
The record shows the trial court failed to rule on appellee's habeas corpus petition within the sixty days required by article 11.072. However, because the trial court ultimately ruled on the petition, we conclude that the timing issue is moot. (6) The State's third issue is overruled.
In its first issue, the State contends the trial court used the incorrect legal standard to evaluate appellee's newly-discovered evidence claim. Claims of actual innocence fall into two categories: Herrera claims and Schlup claims. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995); Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993). A bare claim of actual innocence based solely on newly-discovered evidence is an Herrera claim, whereas a claim of actual innocence that is tied to a claim of constitutional error at trial is a Schlup claim. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 314. Because the Herrera and Schlup claims are different, they employ different burdens of proof. Id.
Because the verdict of a constitutional-error-free trial commands the greatest respect, the criminal justice system has a need for finality, and retrying stale cases that were originally tried years before imposes a heavy burden on the State, the burden of proof in Herrera claims is "extraordinarily high." See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417; Davila v. State, 147 S.W.3d 572, 577-78 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2004, pet. ref'd). To succeed in an Herrera claim, "the petitioner must show by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence." Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202, 209 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
Appellee's first trial was found to be error-free by this Court in Morin v. State, No. 13-01-00001, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 3783 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. ref'd) (not designated for publication). Furthermore, appellee's claim of innocence is unaccompanied by a claim of constitutional error and is therefore an Herrera claim. Accordingly, appellee must show by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence. Because the trial court ruled that "the proper forum to decide the credibility of a victim is the jury," we conclude it used the wrong legal standard. The State's first issue is sustained.
In light of our disposition of the State's first and third issues, it is unnecessary to address the State's second issue. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
The trial court's order granting appellee's application for a writ of habeas corpus is reversed. The case is remanded to the trial court to timely determine whether appellee has shown by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence. (7)
FEDERICO G. HINOJOSA
Justice
Do not publish. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
Memorandum Opinion delivered and filed
this the 17th day of August, 2006.
1.
See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.01(k) (Vernon Supp. 2006) ("The state is entitled to appeal an order granting relief to an applicant for a writ of habeas corpus under Article 11.072.").
2.
This Court affirmed appellee's conviction on May 23, 2002. See Morin v. State, No. 13-01-001-CR, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 3783 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. ref'd).
3. Appellee is Veronica Salazar's uncle by marriage to her mother's sister.
4. The record reflects that the parties agreed to proceed under article 11.072, and that relator did not need to refile.
5.
Because the State's third issue affects our ability to consider the State's remaining two issues, we will decide it first.
6.
We find it particularly disingenuous that the State, after misleading the trial court about when the sixty-day deadline would run, and then promising to waive it in any event, is now raising it as an issue on appeal.
7.
It would be improper for this Court to evaluate the merits of appellee's petition de novo because only the district court has the power to grant appellee's petition. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art 11.072 (Vernon 2005); see also Ex parte Franklin, 72 S.W.3d 671, 675 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (ordering remand of article 11.07 habeas petition to consider under correct standard).
NUMBER 13-05-00181-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant,
v.
ESTANISLADO MORIN, Appellee.
On appeal from the 275th District Court of Hidalgo County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Hinojosa, Rodriguez, and Garza
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Hinojosa
The State appeals from the trial court's order granting appellee Estanislado Morin's application for writ of habeas corpus and granting a new trial. (1) In three issues, the State contends the trial court (1) used the incorrect legal standard to evaluate appellee's newly-discovered evidence claim, (2) abused its discretion in granting his application for writ of habeas corpus based on newly-discovered evidence, and (3) failed to enter the habeas corpus order within the statutory time limit. We reverse and remand.
A. Factual & Procedural Background
A jury found appellee guilty of two counts of indecency with a child and assessed his punishment at five years' imprisonment and a $ 5,000 fine for each count. Because the jury recommended that the prison sentences and fines for both counts be suspended and that appellee be placed on community supervision, the trial court suspended the prison sentences and fines for both counts, and placed appellee on community supervision for five years for each count. (2) Subsequently, appellee was deported and complied with the terms of his community supervision by mail.
On October 10, 2003, appellee applied for a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus pursuant to article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, alleging (1) ineffective assistance of counsel and (2) newly-discovered evidence of innocence. In support of his newly-discovered evidence allegations, appellee attached an affidavit of the complaining witness, Veronica Salazar, (3) dated September 19, 2003, wherein she recanted her prior testimony. The State did not receive notice of the application until April 27, 2004, and filed a response on May 24, 2004. The State attached an affidavit, dated May 4, 2004, wherein Salazar recanted her September 19, 2003 recantation. The State also noted that appellee should have filed his post-conviction writ pursuant to article 11.072, instead of article 11.07. (4) See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 11.07, 11.072 (Vernon 2005).
On May 27, 2004, the trial court overruled appellee's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and ordered a hearing on appellee's issue regarding the newly-discovered evidence of innocence. That hearing was held on June 29, 2004, and Salazar testified about her conflicting affidavits. The proceedings were then recessed to July 16, 2004, so that appellee, who was absent because of his deportation, could be present.
The hearing resumed on July 16, 2004, without appellee, who waived his presence. Both sides discussed the sixty-day statutory deadline at great length, and several times the State told the trial court that it would waive the sixty-day deadline, if it could be waived. Both sides mistakenly told the court when they thought the sixty-day deadline would elapse. Salazar testified again regarding her affidavits, explaining that she was pressured by family members to execute the September 19, 2003 affidavit, and her testimony at trial was truthful. After the hearing, the trial court said that before it ruled, it wanted additional memorandums from both sides. On October 22, 2004, the trial court ruled that Salazar's credibility was a question for a jury, and orally granted appellee a new trial. A written order reflecting this ruling was signed on March 4, 2005.
B. Standard of Review
In reviewing a district court's decision to grant a habeas corpus petition, we review the application of legal standards de novo. Ex parte Peterson, 117 S.W.3d 804, 819 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). We afford almost total deference to the trial judge's determination of the historical facts supported by the record, especially when the fact findings are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. See Ex parte Martin, 6 S.W.3d 524, 526 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). However, "if the record will not support the trial judge's conclusions, then this Court may make contrary findings." See Ex parte Adams, 768 S.W.2d 281, 288 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
C. Discussion
In its third issue, the State contends the trial court erred by failing to enter its written order within the statutory deadline of sixty days. The State argues that because the order was not entered within the sixty-day period, the order is void and appellee's application was denied by operation of law. (5)
Article 11.072 of the code of criminal procedure provides that: "Not later than the 60th day after the day on which the State's answer is filed, the trial court shall enter a written order granting or denying the relief sought in the application." Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.072. Because the State's answer to appellee's application was filed on May 24, 2004, the 60th day was July 23, 2004.
Habeas corpus petitions are to be heard without delay. See Tex. Const. art. I, § 12; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art 11.07; Martin v. Hamlin, 25 S.W.3d 718, 719 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); McCree v. Hampton, 824 S.W.2d 578, 578-79 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). The proper remedy to a trial court's delay in ruling on a habeas corpus petition under article 11.072 is to file for a petition for a writ of mandamus from this Court. See Ex parte Hargett, 819 S.W.2d 866, 868 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). After a trial court's ruling on a habeas corpus petition, compliance with statutory deadlines becomes moot. See McCree, 824 S.W.2d at 579; see also Ex parte Kendrick, No. 01-95-00161-CR, 1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 3400, *2 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, pet. ref'd) (not designated for publication).
The record shows the trial court failed to rule on appellee's habeas corpus petition within the sixty days required by article 11.072. However, because the trial court ultimately ruled on the petition, we conclude that the timing issue is moot. (6) The State's third issue is overruled.
In its first issue, the State contends the trial court used the incorrect legal standard to evaluate appellee's newly-discovered evidence claim. Claims of actual innocence fall into two categories: Herrera claims and Schlup claims. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995); Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993). A bare claim of actual innocence based solely on newly-discovered evidence is an Herrera claim, whereas a claim of actual innocence that is tied to a claim of constitutional error at trial is a Schlup claim. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 314. Because the Herrera and Schlup claims are different, they employ different burdens of proof. Id.
Because the verdict of a constitutional-error-free trial commands the greatest respect, the criminal justice system has a need for finality, and retrying stale cases that were originally tried years before imposes a heavy burden on the State, the burden of proof in Herrera claims is "extraordinarily high." See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417; Davila v. State, 147 S.W.3d 572, 577-78 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2004, pet. ref'd). To succeed in an Herrera claim, "the petitioner must show by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence." Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202, 209 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
Appellee's first trial was found to be error-free by this Court in Morin v. State, No. 13-01-00001, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 3783 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. ref'd) (not designated for publication). Furthermore, appellee's claim of innocence is unaccompanied by a claim of constitutional error and is therefore an Herrera claim. Accordingly, appellee must show by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence. Because the trial court ruled that "the proper forum to decide the credibility of a victim is the jury," we conclude it used the wrong legal standard. The State's first issue is sustained.
In light of our disposition of the State's first and third issues, it is unnecessary to address the State's second issue. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
The trial court's order granting appellee's application for a writ of habeas corpus is reversed. The case is remanded to the trial court to timely determine whether appellee has shown by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence. (7)
FEDERICO G. HINOJOSA
Justice
Do not publish. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
Memorandum Opinion delivered and filed
this the 17th day of August, 2006.
1.
See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.01(k) (Vernon Supp. 2006) ("The state is entitled to appeal an order granting relief to an applicant for a writ of habeas corpus under Article 11.072.").
2.
This Court affirmed appellee's conviction on May 23, 2002. See Morin v. State, No. 13-01-001-CR, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 3783 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. ref'd).
3. Appellee is Veronica Salazar's uncle by marriage to her mother's sister.
4. The record reflects that the parties agreed to proceed under article 11.072, and that relator did not need to refile.
5.
Because the State's third issue affects our ability to consider the State's remaining two issues, we will decide it first.
6.
We find it particularly disingenuous that the State, after misleading the trial court about when the sixty-day deadline would run, and then promising to waive it in any event, is now raising it as an issue on appeal.
7.
It would be improper for this Court to evaluate the merits of appellee's petition de novo because only the district court has the power to grant appellee's petition. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art 11.072 (Vernon 2005); see also Ex parte Franklin, 72 S.W.3d 671, 675 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (ordering remand of article 11.07 habeas petition to consider under correct standard).
Sunday, October 14, 2007
Yup,The dishonorable Sharon Killer, Is a Texas size disgrace and Texans are dehumanized, humiliated and judges kill time legallly.........
Justice is not a title this Killer deserves.
Time is of the essence Keller,now you are a killer.
Unilateral decision making is "like a death row pardon 2 minutes too late...isn't it ironic?"
Any excuse is moot and ignorance aint a defense.
I know, I know, she can not recall.
Life unworthy of life (in German: Lebensunwertes Leben) was a Nazi term for those human beings who, by reason of their purported racial or genetic background, the Nazis believed had no right to live and thus should be killed. This concept formed a large component of the Nazi mindset. The phrase first occurs in the title of a 1920 book, Die Freigabe der Vernichtung Lebensunwerten Lebens, (Release for Annihilation of Life Unworthy of Life) by Karl Binding and Alfred Hoche.
People considered to be deviant or a source of social turmoil were put together in this category. The deviant category included the mentally or physically disabled, political dissidents, homosexuals or criminals; the social turmoil category included the clergy, communists, Jews, Roma, Sami, Jehovah's Witnesses, and a variety of other groups in society. More than any other of these groups, the Jews soon became the primary focus of this ideology.
This philosophy found its purest expression in extermination camps built and operated by the Nazis during the Holocaust in order to systematically kill these and other groups that the Nazis decided were unfit to be permitted to live.
Time is of the essence Keller,now you are a killer.
Unilateral decision making is "like a death row pardon 2 minutes too late...isn't it ironic?"
Any excuse is moot and ignorance aint a defense.
I know, I know, she can not recall.
Life unworthy of life (in German: Lebensunwertes Leben) was a Nazi term for those human beings who, by reason of their purported racial or genetic background, the Nazis believed had no right to live and thus should be killed. This concept formed a large component of the Nazi mindset. The phrase first occurs in the title of a 1920 book, Die Freigabe der Vernichtung Lebensunwerten Lebens, (Release for Annihilation of Life Unworthy of Life) by Karl Binding and Alfred Hoche.
People considered to be deviant or a source of social turmoil were put together in this category. The deviant category included the mentally or physically disabled, political dissidents, homosexuals or criminals; the social turmoil category included the clergy, communists, Jews, Roma, Sami, Jehovah's Witnesses, and a variety of other groups in society. More than any other of these groups, the Jews soon became the primary focus of this ideology.
This philosophy found its purest expression in extermination camps built and operated by the Nazis during the Holocaust in order to systematically kill these and other groups that the Nazis decided were unfit to be permitted to live.
Thursday, October 11, 2007
in a civil case, we may take as true facts stated in an appellant's brief that are not contradicted by the appellee, this is a criminal case. Fair? No
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NUMBER 13-06-494-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
DAVID C. MATTHEWS, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the County Court at Law of Lavaca County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Benavides, and Vela
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides
Appellant David Matthews, appearing pro se, appeals his conviction for failure to reduce his speed while passing an authorized emergency vehicle. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 545.157 (Vernon Supp. 2006). After a jury trial, Matthews was fined $100.00, assessed court costs of $224.00, and assessed a transaction fee of $2.00. Matthews contends (1) that the prosecutor's closing argument conclusively demonstrates that he could not have slowed down to the speed required by law, and (2) that the prosecutor committed misconduct by prosecuting Matthews with knowledge of these "extenuating circumstances" surrounding his alleged traffic violation. We affirm.
I. Background
On March 19, 2006, Matthews was ticketed for failure to reduce his speed while passing an emergency vehicle. The traffic citation appears in the record, and it states that Matthews was traveling at a speed of sixty miles per hour in a seventy mile per hour zone while passing the emergency vehicle. (1)
Matthews contested the traffic citation in the Justice Court of Lavaca County. After a non-jury trial, the justice court found Matthews guilty and assessed a fine of $196.00. Matthews appealed that decision to the County Court of Lavaca County. There, he pleaded not guilty and requested a jury trial. A jury of six was empaneled, and the case was tried on August 28, 2006.
The jury charge and verdict appear in the clerk's record. The jury found Matthews guilty and assessed a fine of $100.00 plus court costs. The reporter's record, however, consists of only a small portion of the trial-specifically, it includes only the Lavaca County Attorney's closing argument.
The Lavaca County Attorney argued that the evidence showed that Matthews was the driver of a vehicle on public highway US 77 in Lavaca County. She argued that Matthews failed to reduce his speed while passing a state trooper's parked emergency vehicle. The state trooper, Corporal Matthew Southall, had his emergency lights on and was issuing a traffic ticket to another driver. The county attorney argued that according to Southall's testimony, Matthews was traveling at sixty miles per hour where the posted speed limit was seventy miles per hour.
The portion of the transcript that Matthews relies on for his appeal is as follows:
[The radar] hit Mr. Matthews. He said 60. He said 58 for the truck that was behind him. Common sense tells you Mr. Matthews is in front, truck's in back. Truck's going 58. Mr. Matthews has to be going faster than 58. Mr. Matthews wants you to believe that the fact - if the radar - here's Corporal Southall's car, if the radar hits him and he is already passing by it's not a legitimate offense. Yes, it is. And the corporal said it is. It is because there is no way, physically, when Mr. Matthews is approaching this stationary emergency vehicle, that he could have been going 50 miles an hour. That is what the corporal testified to. . . . Corporal said there's no way that Mr. Matthews was ever going 50 miles-an-hour when he was passing the stationary emergency vehicle. It's that simple.
After his conviction, Matthews filed a pro se brief with this Court. The State has not filed a brief.
II. Analysis
Matthews's issue apparently revolves around whether the county attorney admitted a significant fact during her closing argument. He asserts that the county attorney
[i]n her closing argument . . . pointed out that the vehicle following mine was traveling at 58 mph and therefore I could not have slowed down to 50 mph traveling through the emergency scene. . . . I submit that having been fully aware of these extenuating circumstances [the county attorney] still decided to proceed to trial which in turn means that this was not a good faith prosecution. In fact, deciding to proceed against an individual in full knowledge of their innocence constitutes malicious prosecution.
Matthews misconstrues the county attorney's closing argument. Nowhere in the transcript does the county attorney ever say that it was impossible for Matthews to slow down to an appropriate speed while passing the emergency vehicle. Rather, the county attorney was attempting to counter Matthews's argument that, although the radar registered him as traveling at sixty miles per hour after he had already passed the emergency vehicle, he was actually traveling fifty miles per hour while passing.
The county attorney merely stated that it was impossible that Matthews was traveling at fifty miles per hour when he passed the trooper. Her argument was that Matthews must have been going faster because the car immediately behind him was traveling at fifty-eight miles per hour when it passed. Nothing in this statement indicates that Matthews was unable to apply his brakes and reduce his speed, as Matthews contends. If such evidence was presented by Matthews at trial, we have no knowledge of it because the record is incomplete.
Although in a civil case, we may take as true facts stated in an appellant's brief that are not contradicted by the appellee, this is a criminal case. Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(f). Even so, we are not authorized to ignore the record on appeal and reverse a lower court based on statements by the appellant that are directly contradicted by the record. The record simply does not support Matthews's argument.
Moreover, the record does not reveal any objection to the allegedly inappropriate prosecution and closing argument; no motion for a mistrial related to prosecutorial misconduct was filed. Accordingly, Matthews's two complaints were not preserved for review. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1.
Finally, even had Matthews preserved error, his brief is entirely devoid of citations to legal authority. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(h). Although we recognize that pro se litigants are entitled to greater leniency, they are not exempt from the rules of procedure. Wheeler v. Green, 157 S.W.3d 439, 444 (Tex. 2005). We cannot remedy deficiencies in a litigant's brief or provide an adequate record when none is presented by the appellant. Green v. Kaposta, 152 S.W.3d 839, 841 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.). Both of Matthews's issues are overruled.
III. Conclusion
Finding that Matthews has not presented anything for our review, we affirm the trial court's judgment of conviction.
__________________________
GINA M. BENAVIDES
Justice
Do not publish.
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
Memorandum Opinion delivered and
filed this the 23rd day of August, 2007.
1. Texas Transportation Code section 545.157(a) provides:
(a) On approaching a stationary authorized emergency vehicle using visual signals that meet the requirements of Sections 547.305 and 547.702, an operator, unless otherwise directed by a police officer, shall:
(1) vacate the lane closest to the emergency vehicle when driving on a
highway with two or more lanes traveling in the direction of the
emergency vehicle; or
(2) slow to a speed not to exceed:
(A) 20 miles per hour less than the posted speed limit when the
posted speed limit is 25 miles per hour or more; or
(B) five miles per hour when the posted speed limit is less than 25
miles per hour.
NUMBER 13-06-494-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
DAVID C. MATTHEWS, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the County Court at Law of Lavaca County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Benavides, and Vela
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides
Appellant David Matthews, appearing pro se, appeals his conviction for failure to reduce his speed while passing an authorized emergency vehicle. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 545.157 (Vernon Supp. 2006). After a jury trial, Matthews was fined $100.00, assessed court costs of $224.00, and assessed a transaction fee of $2.00. Matthews contends (1) that the prosecutor's closing argument conclusively demonstrates that he could not have slowed down to the speed required by law, and (2) that the prosecutor committed misconduct by prosecuting Matthews with knowledge of these "extenuating circumstances" surrounding his alleged traffic violation. We affirm.
I. Background
On March 19, 2006, Matthews was ticketed for failure to reduce his speed while passing an emergency vehicle. The traffic citation appears in the record, and it states that Matthews was traveling at a speed of sixty miles per hour in a seventy mile per hour zone while passing the emergency vehicle. (1)
Matthews contested the traffic citation in the Justice Court of Lavaca County. After a non-jury trial, the justice court found Matthews guilty and assessed a fine of $196.00. Matthews appealed that decision to the County Court of Lavaca County. There, he pleaded not guilty and requested a jury trial. A jury of six was empaneled, and the case was tried on August 28, 2006.
The jury charge and verdict appear in the clerk's record. The jury found Matthews guilty and assessed a fine of $100.00 plus court costs. The reporter's record, however, consists of only a small portion of the trial-specifically, it includes only the Lavaca County Attorney's closing argument.
The Lavaca County Attorney argued that the evidence showed that Matthews was the driver of a vehicle on public highway US 77 in Lavaca County. She argued that Matthews failed to reduce his speed while passing a state trooper's parked emergency vehicle. The state trooper, Corporal Matthew Southall, had his emergency lights on and was issuing a traffic ticket to another driver. The county attorney argued that according to Southall's testimony, Matthews was traveling at sixty miles per hour where the posted speed limit was seventy miles per hour.
The portion of the transcript that Matthews relies on for his appeal is as follows:
[The radar] hit Mr. Matthews. He said 60. He said 58 for the truck that was behind him. Common sense tells you Mr. Matthews is in front, truck's in back. Truck's going 58. Mr. Matthews has to be going faster than 58. Mr. Matthews wants you to believe that the fact - if the radar - here's Corporal Southall's car, if the radar hits him and he is already passing by it's not a legitimate offense. Yes, it is. And the corporal said it is. It is because there is no way, physically, when Mr. Matthews is approaching this stationary emergency vehicle, that he could have been going 50 miles an hour. That is what the corporal testified to. . . . Corporal said there's no way that Mr. Matthews was ever going 50 miles-an-hour when he was passing the stationary emergency vehicle. It's that simple.
After his conviction, Matthews filed a pro se brief with this Court. The State has not filed a brief.
II. Analysis
Matthews's issue apparently revolves around whether the county attorney admitted a significant fact during her closing argument. He asserts that the county attorney
[i]n her closing argument . . . pointed out that the vehicle following mine was traveling at 58 mph and therefore I could not have slowed down to 50 mph traveling through the emergency scene. . . . I submit that having been fully aware of these extenuating circumstances [the county attorney] still decided to proceed to trial which in turn means that this was not a good faith prosecution. In fact, deciding to proceed against an individual in full knowledge of their innocence constitutes malicious prosecution.
Matthews misconstrues the county attorney's closing argument. Nowhere in the transcript does the county attorney ever say that it was impossible for Matthews to slow down to an appropriate speed while passing the emergency vehicle. Rather, the county attorney was attempting to counter Matthews's argument that, although the radar registered him as traveling at sixty miles per hour after he had already passed the emergency vehicle, he was actually traveling fifty miles per hour while passing.
The county attorney merely stated that it was impossible that Matthews was traveling at fifty miles per hour when he passed the trooper. Her argument was that Matthews must have been going faster because the car immediately behind him was traveling at fifty-eight miles per hour when it passed. Nothing in this statement indicates that Matthews was unable to apply his brakes and reduce his speed, as Matthews contends. If such evidence was presented by Matthews at trial, we have no knowledge of it because the record is incomplete.
Although in a civil case, we may take as true facts stated in an appellant's brief that are not contradicted by the appellee, this is a criminal case. Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(f). Even so, we are not authorized to ignore the record on appeal and reverse a lower court based on statements by the appellant that are directly contradicted by the record. The record simply does not support Matthews's argument.
Moreover, the record does not reveal any objection to the allegedly inappropriate prosecution and closing argument; no motion for a mistrial related to prosecutorial misconduct was filed. Accordingly, Matthews's two complaints were not preserved for review. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1.
Finally, even had Matthews preserved error, his brief is entirely devoid of citations to legal authority. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(h). Although we recognize that pro se litigants are entitled to greater leniency, they are not exempt from the rules of procedure. Wheeler v. Green, 157 S.W.3d 439, 444 (Tex. 2005). We cannot remedy deficiencies in a litigant's brief or provide an adequate record when none is presented by the appellant. Green v. Kaposta, 152 S.W.3d 839, 841 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.). Both of Matthews's issues are overruled.
III. Conclusion
Finding that Matthews has not presented anything for our review, we affirm the trial court's judgment of conviction.
__________________________
GINA M. BENAVIDES
Justice
Do not publish.
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
Memorandum Opinion delivered and
filed this the 23rd day of August, 2007.
1. Texas Transportation Code section 545.157(a) provides:
(a) On approaching a stationary authorized emergency vehicle using visual signals that meet the requirements of Sections 547.305 and 547.702, an operator, unless otherwise directed by a police officer, shall:
(1) vacate the lane closest to the emergency vehicle when driving on a
highway with two or more lanes traveling in the direction of the
emergency vehicle; or
(2) slow to a speed not to exceed:
(A) 20 miles per hour less than the posted speed limit when the
posted speed limit is 25 miles per hour or more; or
(B) five miles per hour when the posted speed limit is less than 25
miles per hour.
Sunday, September 16, 2007
Too bad John Hubert and Patti Hubert need to read this again
THE TEXAS LAWYER'S CREED
A Mandate for Professionalism
Promulgated by The Supreme Court of Texas and the Court of Criminal Appeals November 7, 1989
I am a lawyer; I am entrusted by the People of Texas to preserve and improve our legal system. I am licensed by the Supreme Court of Texas. I must therefore abide by the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, but I know that Professionalism requires more than merely avoiding the violation of laws and rules. I am committed to this Creed for no other reason than it is right.
I. OUR LEGAL SYSTEM
A lawyer owes to the administration of justice personal dignity, integrity, and independence. A lawyer should always adhere to the highest principles of professionalism.
1. I am passionately proud of my profession. Therefore, "My word is my bond."
2. I am responsible to assure that all persons have access to competent representation regardless of wealth or position in life.
3. I commit myself to an adequate and effective pro bono program.
4. I am obligated to educate my clients, the public, and other lawyers regarding the spirit and letter of this Creed.
5. I will always be conscious of my duty to the judicial system.
II. LAWYER TO CLIENT
A lawyer owes to a client allegiance, learning, skill, and industry. A lawyer shall employ all appropriate means to protect and advance the client's legitimate rights, claims, and objectives. A lawyer shall not be deterred by any real or imagined fear of judicial disfavor or public unpopularity, nor be influenced by mere self-interest.
1. I will advise my client of the contents of this Creed when undertaking representation.
2. I will endeavor to achieve my client's lawful objectives in legal transactions and in litigation as quickly and economically as possible.
3. I will be loyal and committed to my client's lawful objectives, but I will not permit that loyalty and commitment to interfere with my duty to provide objective and independent advice.
4. I will advise my client that civility and courtesy are expected and are not a sign of weakness.
5. I will advise my client of proper and expected behavior.
6. I will treat adverse parties and witnesses with fairness and due consideration. A client has no right to demand that I abuse anyone or indulge in any offensive conduct.
7. I will advise my client that we will not pursue conduct which is intended primarily to harass or drain the financial resources of the opposing party.
8. I will advise my client that we will not pursue tactics which are intended primarily for delay.
9. I will advise my client that we will not pursue any course of action which is without merit.
10. I will advise my client that I reserve the right to determine whether to grant accommodations to opposing counsel in all matters that do not adversely affect my client's lawful objectives. A client has no right to instruct me to refuse reasonable requests made by other counsel.
11. I will advise my client regarding the availability of mediation, arbitration, and other alternative methods of resolving and settling disputes.
III. LAWYER TO LAWYER
A lawyer owes to opposing counsel, in the conduct of legal transactions and the pursuit of litigation, courtesy, candor, cooperation, and scrupulous observance of all agreements and mutual understandings. Ill feelings between clients shall not influence a lawyer's conduct, attitude, or demeanor toward opposing counsel. A lawyer shall not engage in unprofessional conduct in retaliation against other unprofessional conduct.
1. I will be courteous, civil, and prompt in oral and written communications.
2. I will not quarrel over matters of form or style, but I will concentrate on matters of substance.
3. I will identify for other counsel or parties all changes I have made in documents submitted for review.
4. I will attempt to prepare documents which correctly reflect the agreement of the parties. I will not include provisions which have not been agreed upon or omit provisions which are necessary to reflect the agreement of the parties.
5. I will notify opposing counsel, and, if appropriate, the Court or other persons, as soon as practicable, when hearings, depositions, meetings, conferences or closings are cancelled.
6. I will agree to reasonable requests for extensions of time and for waiver of procedural formalities, provided legitimate objectives of my client will not be adversely affected.
7. I will not serve motions or pleadings in any manner that unfairly limits another party's opportunity to respond.
8. I will attempt to resolve by agreement my objections to matters contained in pleadings and discovery requests and responses.
9. I can disagree without being disagreeable. I recognize that effective representation does not require antagonistic or obnoxious behavior. I will neither encourage nor knowingly permit my client or anyone under my control to do anything which would be unethical or improper if done by me.
10. I will not, without good cause, attribute bad motives or unethical conduct to opposing counsel nor bring the profession into disrepute by unfounded accusations of impropriety. I will avoid disparaging personal remarks or acrimony towards opposing counsel, parties and witnesses. I will not be influenced by any ill feeling between clients. I will abstain from any allusion to personal peculiarities or idiosyncrasies of opposing counsel.
11. I will not take advantage, by causing any default or dismissal to be rendered, when I know the identity of an opposing counsel, without first inquiring about that counsel's intention to proceed.
12. I will promptly submit orders to the Court. I will deliver copies to opposing counsel before or contemporaneously with submission to the court. I will promptly approve the form of orders which accurately reflect the substance of the rulings of the Court.
13. I will not attempt to gain an unfair advantage by sending the Court or its staff correspondence or copies of correspondence.
14. I will not arbitrarily schedule a deposition, Court appearance, or hearing until a good faith effort has been made to schedule it by agreement.
15. I will readily stipulate to undisputed facts in order to avoid needless costs or inconvenience for any party.
16. I will refrain from excessive and abusive discovery.
17. I will comply with all reasonable discovery requests. I will not resist discovery requests which are not objectionable. I will not make objections nor give instructions to a witness for the purpose of delaying or obstructing the discovery process. I will encourage witnesses to respond to all deposition questions which are reasonably understandable. I will neither encourage nor permit my witness to quibble about words where their meaning is reasonably clear.
18. I will not seek Court intervention to obtain discovery which is clearly improper and not discoverable.
19. I will not seek sanctions or disqualification unless it is necessary for protection of my client's lawful objectives or is fully justified by the circumstances.
IV. LAWYER AND JUDGE
Lawyers and judges owe each other respect, diligence, candor, punctuality, and protection against unjust and improper criticism and attack. Lawyers and judges are equally responsible to protect the dignity and independence of the Court and the profession.
1. I will always recognize that the position of judge is the symbol of both the judicial system and administration of justice. I will refrain from conduct that degrades this symbol.
2. I will conduct myself in court in a professional manner and demonstrate my respect for the Court and the law.
3. I will treat counsel, opposing parties, witnesses, the Court, and members of the Court staff with courtesy and civility and will not manifest by words or conduct bias or prejudice based on race, color, national origin, religion, disability, age, sex, or sexual orientation.
4. I will be punctual.
5. I will not engage in any conduct which offends the dignity and decorum of proceedings.
6. I will not knowingly misrepresent, mischaracterize, misquote or miscite facts or authorities to gain an advantage.
7. I will respect the rulings of the Court.
8. I will give the issues in controversy deliberate, impartial and studied analysis and consideration.
9. I will be considerate of the time constraints and pressures imposed upon the Court, Court staff and counsel in efforts to administer justice and resolve disputes.
Order of the Supreme Court of Texas and the Court of Criminal Appeals
The conduct of a lawyer should be characterized at all times by honesty, candor, and fairness. In fulfilling his or her primary duty to a client, a lawyer must be ever mindful of the profession's broader duty to the legal system.
The Supreme Court of Texas and the Court of Criminal Appeals are committed to eliminating a practice in our State by a minority of lawyers of abusive tactics which have surfaced in many parts of our country. We believe such tactics are a disservice to our citizens, harmful to clients, and demeaning to our profession.
The abusive tactics range from lack of civility to outright hostility and obstructionism. Such behavior does not serve justice but tends to delay and often deny justice. The lawyers who use abusive tactics, instead of being part of the solution, have become part of the problem.
The desire for respect and confidence by lawyers from the public should provide the members of our profession with the necessary incentive to attain the highest degree of ethical and professional conduct. These rules are primarily aspirational. Compliance with the rules depends primarily upon understanding and voluntary compliance, secondarily upon reenforcement by peer pressure and public opinion, and finally when necessary by enforcement by the courts through their inherent powers and rules already in existence.
These standards are not a set of rules that lawyers can use and abuse to incite ancillary litigation or arguments over whether or not they have been observed.
We must always be mindful that the practice of law is a profession. As members of a learned art we pursue a common calling in the spirit of public service. We have a proud tradition. Throughout the history of our nation, the members of our citizenry have looked to the ranks of our profession for leadership and guidance. Let us now as a profession each rededicate ourselves to practice law so we can restore public confidence in our profession, faithfully serve our clients, and fulfill our responsibility to the legal system.
The Supreme Court of Texas and the Court of Criminal Appeals hereby promulgate and adopt "The Texas Lawyer's Creed -- A Mandate for Professionalism" described above.
In Chambers, this 7th day of November, 1989.
The Supreme Court of Texas
Thomas R. Phillips, Chief Justice
Franklin S. Spears, Justice
C. L. Ray, Justice
Raul A. Gonzalez, Justice
Oscar H. Mauzy, Justice
Eugene A. Cook, Justice
Jack Hightower, Justice
Nathan L. Hecht, Justice
Lloyd A. Doggett, Justice
The Court of Criminal Appeals
Michael J. McCormick, Presiding Judge
W. C. Davis, Judge
Sam Houston Clinton, Judge
Marvin O. Teague, Judge
Chuck Miller, Judge
Charles F. (Chuck) Campbell, Judge
Bill White, Judge
M. P. Duncan, III, Judge
David A. Berchelmann, Jr., Judge
A Mandate for Professionalism
Promulgated by The Supreme Court of Texas and the Court of Criminal Appeals November 7, 1989
I am a lawyer; I am entrusted by the People of Texas to preserve and improve our legal system. I am licensed by the Supreme Court of Texas. I must therefore abide by the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, but I know that Professionalism requires more than merely avoiding the violation of laws and rules. I am committed to this Creed for no other reason than it is right.
I. OUR LEGAL SYSTEM
A lawyer owes to the administration of justice personal dignity, integrity, and independence. A lawyer should always adhere to the highest principles of professionalism.
1. I am passionately proud of my profession. Therefore, "My word is my bond."
2. I am responsible to assure that all persons have access to competent representation regardless of wealth or position in life.
3. I commit myself to an adequate and effective pro bono program.
4. I am obligated to educate my clients, the public, and other lawyers regarding the spirit and letter of this Creed.
5. I will always be conscious of my duty to the judicial system.
II. LAWYER TO CLIENT
A lawyer owes to a client allegiance, learning, skill, and industry. A lawyer shall employ all appropriate means to protect and advance the client's legitimate rights, claims, and objectives. A lawyer shall not be deterred by any real or imagined fear of judicial disfavor or public unpopularity, nor be influenced by mere self-interest.
1. I will advise my client of the contents of this Creed when undertaking representation.
2. I will endeavor to achieve my client's lawful objectives in legal transactions and in litigation as quickly and economically as possible.
3. I will be loyal and committed to my client's lawful objectives, but I will not permit that loyalty and commitment to interfere with my duty to provide objective and independent advice.
4. I will advise my client that civility and courtesy are expected and are not a sign of weakness.
5. I will advise my client of proper and expected behavior.
6. I will treat adverse parties and witnesses with fairness and due consideration. A client has no right to demand that I abuse anyone or indulge in any offensive conduct.
7. I will advise my client that we will not pursue conduct which is intended primarily to harass or drain the financial resources of the opposing party.
8. I will advise my client that we will not pursue tactics which are intended primarily for delay.
9. I will advise my client that we will not pursue any course of action which is without merit.
10. I will advise my client that I reserve the right to determine whether to grant accommodations to opposing counsel in all matters that do not adversely affect my client's lawful objectives. A client has no right to instruct me to refuse reasonable requests made by other counsel.
11. I will advise my client regarding the availability of mediation, arbitration, and other alternative methods of resolving and settling disputes.
III. LAWYER TO LAWYER
A lawyer owes to opposing counsel, in the conduct of legal transactions and the pursuit of litigation, courtesy, candor, cooperation, and scrupulous observance of all agreements and mutual understandings. Ill feelings between clients shall not influence a lawyer's conduct, attitude, or demeanor toward opposing counsel. A lawyer shall not engage in unprofessional conduct in retaliation against other unprofessional conduct.
1. I will be courteous, civil, and prompt in oral and written communications.
2. I will not quarrel over matters of form or style, but I will concentrate on matters of substance.
3. I will identify for other counsel or parties all changes I have made in documents submitted for review.
4. I will attempt to prepare documents which correctly reflect the agreement of the parties. I will not include provisions which have not been agreed upon or omit provisions which are necessary to reflect the agreement of the parties.
5. I will notify opposing counsel, and, if appropriate, the Court or other persons, as soon as practicable, when hearings, depositions, meetings, conferences or closings are cancelled.
6. I will agree to reasonable requests for extensions of time and for waiver of procedural formalities, provided legitimate objectives of my client will not be adversely affected.
7. I will not serve motions or pleadings in any manner that unfairly limits another party's opportunity to respond.
8. I will attempt to resolve by agreement my objections to matters contained in pleadings and discovery requests and responses.
9. I can disagree without being disagreeable. I recognize that effective representation does not require antagonistic or obnoxious behavior. I will neither encourage nor knowingly permit my client or anyone under my control to do anything which would be unethical or improper if done by me.
10. I will not, without good cause, attribute bad motives or unethical conduct to opposing counsel nor bring the profession into disrepute by unfounded accusations of impropriety. I will avoid disparaging personal remarks or acrimony towards opposing counsel, parties and witnesses. I will not be influenced by any ill feeling between clients. I will abstain from any allusion to personal peculiarities or idiosyncrasies of opposing counsel.
11. I will not take advantage, by causing any default or dismissal to be rendered, when I know the identity of an opposing counsel, without first inquiring about that counsel's intention to proceed.
12. I will promptly submit orders to the Court. I will deliver copies to opposing counsel before or contemporaneously with submission to the court. I will promptly approve the form of orders which accurately reflect the substance of the rulings of the Court.
13. I will not attempt to gain an unfair advantage by sending the Court or its staff correspondence or copies of correspondence.
14. I will not arbitrarily schedule a deposition, Court appearance, or hearing until a good faith effort has been made to schedule it by agreement.
15. I will readily stipulate to undisputed facts in order to avoid needless costs or inconvenience for any party.
16. I will refrain from excessive and abusive discovery.
17. I will comply with all reasonable discovery requests. I will not resist discovery requests which are not objectionable. I will not make objections nor give instructions to a witness for the purpose of delaying or obstructing the discovery process. I will encourage witnesses to respond to all deposition questions which are reasonably understandable. I will neither encourage nor permit my witness to quibble about words where their meaning is reasonably clear.
18. I will not seek Court intervention to obtain discovery which is clearly improper and not discoverable.
19. I will not seek sanctions or disqualification unless it is necessary for protection of my client's lawful objectives or is fully justified by the circumstances.
IV. LAWYER AND JUDGE
Lawyers and judges owe each other respect, diligence, candor, punctuality, and protection against unjust and improper criticism and attack. Lawyers and judges are equally responsible to protect the dignity and independence of the Court and the profession.
1. I will always recognize that the position of judge is the symbol of both the judicial system and administration of justice. I will refrain from conduct that degrades this symbol.
2. I will conduct myself in court in a professional manner and demonstrate my respect for the Court and the law.
3. I will treat counsel, opposing parties, witnesses, the Court, and members of the Court staff with courtesy and civility and will not manifest by words or conduct bias or prejudice based on race, color, national origin, religion, disability, age, sex, or sexual orientation.
4. I will be punctual.
5. I will not engage in any conduct which offends the dignity and decorum of proceedings.
6. I will not knowingly misrepresent, mischaracterize, misquote or miscite facts or authorities to gain an advantage.
7. I will respect the rulings of the Court.
8. I will give the issues in controversy deliberate, impartial and studied analysis and consideration.
9. I will be considerate of the time constraints and pressures imposed upon the Court, Court staff and counsel in efforts to administer justice and resolve disputes.
Order of the Supreme Court of Texas and the Court of Criminal Appeals
The conduct of a lawyer should be characterized at all times by honesty, candor, and fairness. In fulfilling his or her primary duty to a client, a lawyer must be ever mindful of the profession's broader duty to the legal system.
The Supreme Court of Texas and the Court of Criminal Appeals are committed to eliminating a practice in our State by a minority of lawyers of abusive tactics which have surfaced in many parts of our country. We believe such tactics are a disservice to our citizens, harmful to clients, and demeaning to our profession.
The abusive tactics range from lack of civility to outright hostility and obstructionism. Such behavior does not serve justice but tends to delay and often deny justice. The lawyers who use abusive tactics, instead of being part of the solution, have become part of the problem.
The desire for respect and confidence by lawyers from the public should provide the members of our profession with the necessary incentive to attain the highest degree of ethical and professional conduct. These rules are primarily aspirational. Compliance with the rules depends primarily upon understanding and voluntary compliance, secondarily upon reenforcement by peer pressure and public opinion, and finally when necessary by enforcement by the courts through their inherent powers and rules already in existence.
These standards are not a set of rules that lawyers can use and abuse to incite ancillary litigation or arguments over whether or not they have been observed.
We must always be mindful that the practice of law is a profession. As members of a learned art we pursue a common calling in the spirit of public service. We have a proud tradition. Throughout the history of our nation, the members of our citizenry have looked to the ranks of our profession for leadership and guidance. Let us now as a profession each rededicate ourselves to practice law so we can restore public confidence in our profession, faithfully serve our clients, and fulfill our responsibility to the legal system.
The Supreme Court of Texas and the Court of Criminal Appeals hereby promulgate and adopt "The Texas Lawyer's Creed -- A Mandate for Professionalism" described above.
In Chambers, this 7th day of November, 1989.
The Supreme Court of Texas
Thomas R. Phillips, Chief Justice
Franklin S. Spears, Justice
C. L. Ray, Justice
Raul A. Gonzalez, Justice
Oscar H. Mauzy, Justice
Eugene A. Cook, Justice
Jack Hightower, Justice
Nathan L. Hecht, Justice
Lloyd A. Doggett, Justice
The Court of Criminal Appeals
Michael J. McCormick, Presiding Judge
W. C. Davis, Judge
Sam Houston Clinton, Judge
Marvin O. Teague, Judge
Chuck Miller, Judge
Charles F. (Chuck) Campbell, Judge
Bill White, Judge
M. P. Duncan, III, Judge
David A. Berchelmann, Jr., Judge
Friday, September 14, 2007
Clayton v. State, 169 S.W.3d 254, 255 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2005, pet. granted). This Court reversed his conviction and ordered a judgment acqu...
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NUMBER 13-07-513-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
____________________________________________________________
IN RE LEVIYAS JAMAIL CLAYTON
____________________________________________________________
On Petition for Writ of Mandamus
____________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Yañez, Rodriguez, and Garza
Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion (1)
Relator, Leviyas Jamail Clayton, pro se, filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the above cause on August 20, 2007. Relator contends that he is being illegally incarcerated and asks this Court to compel his release. We deny the petition for writ of mandamus.
Relator was convicted of murder and sentenced to thirty years' imprisonment. See Clayton v. State, 169 S.W.3d 254, 255 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2005, pet. granted). This Court reversed his conviction and ordered a judgment of acquittal. See id. at 258. The court of criminal appeals has granted the State's petition for discretionary review.
Through this original proceeding, relator contends that Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 51.2(d) compels his immediate release from prison. See Tex. R. App. P. 51.2(d). Rule 51.2(d) provides that "When the appellate court reverses a judgment and orders the defendant's acquittal, the defendant-if in custody-must be discharged, and no further order or judgment of the trial court is necessary." See id.
Rule 51.2(d) must be read in conjunction with the code of criminal procedure. Under article 44.04(h):
If a conviction is reversed by a decision of a Court of Appeals, the defendant, if in custody, is entitled to release on reasonable bail, regardless of the length of term of imprisonment, pending final determination of an appeal by the state or the defendant on a motion for discretionary review. If the defendant requests bail before a petition for discretionary review has been filed, the Court of Appeals shall determine the amount of bail. If the defendant requests bail after a petition for discretionary review has been filed, the Court of Criminal Appeals shall determine the amount of bail. The sureties on the bail must be approved by the court where the trial was had. The defendant's right to release under this subsection attaches immediately on the issuance of the Court of Appeals' final ruling as defined by Tex. Cr. App. R. 209(c).
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.04(h) (Vernon 2006). Accordingly, to the extent that relator is seeking release from imprisonment pending the resolution of his appeal, relator would be required to request bail from the court of criminal appeals. See id.
The Court, having examined and fully considered the petition for writ of mandamus, is of the opinion that relator has not shown himself entitled to the relief sought. Accordingly, the petition for writ of mandamus is DENIED. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(a). Any pending motions are denied as moot.
PER CURIAM
Do not publish.
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
Memorandum Opinion delivered and
filed this 11th day of September, 2007.
1. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(d) ("When denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not required to do so."); Tex. R. App. P. 47.4 (distinguishing opinions and memorandum opinions).
NUMBER 13-07-513-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
____________________________________________________________
IN RE LEVIYAS JAMAIL CLAYTON
____________________________________________________________
On Petition for Writ of Mandamus
____________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Yañez, Rodriguez, and Garza
Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion (1)
Relator, Leviyas Jamail Clayton, pro se, filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the above cause on August 20, 2007. Relator contends that he is being illegally incarcerated and asks this Court to compel his release. We deny the petition for writ of mandamus.
Relator was convicted of murder and sentenced to thirty years' imprisonment. See Clayton v. State, 169 S.W.3d 254, 255 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2005, pet. granted). This Court reversed his conviction and ordered a judgment of acquittal. See id. at 258. The court of criminal appeals has granted the State's petition for discretionary review.
Through this original proceeding, relator contends that Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 51.2(d) compels his immediate release from prison. See Tex. R. App. P. 51.2(d). Rule 51.2(d) provides that "When the appellate court reverses a judgment and orders the defendant's acquittal, the defendant-if in custody-must be discharged, and no further order or judgment of the trial court is necessary." See id.
Rule 51.2(d) must be read in conjunction with the code of criminal procedure. Under article 44.04(h):
If a conviction is reversed by a decision of a Court of Appeals, the defendant, if in custody, is entitled to release on reasonable bail, regardless of the length of term of imprisonment, pending final determination of an appeal by the state or the defendant on a motion for discretionary review. If the defendant requests bail before a petition for discretionary review has been filed, the Court of Appeals shall determine the amount of bail. If the defendant requests bail after a petition for discretionary review has been filed, the Court of Criminal Appeals shall determine the amount of bail. The sureties on the bail must be approved by the court where the trial was had. The defendant's right to release under this subsection attaches immediately on the issuance of the Court of Appeals' final ruling as defined by Tex. Cr. App. R. 209(c).
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.04(h) (Vernon 2006). Accordingly, to the extent that relator is seeking release from imprisonment pending the resolution of his appeal, relator would be required to request bail from the court of criminal appeals. See id.
The Court, having examined and fully considered the petition for writ of mandamus, is of the opinion that relator has not shown himself entitled to the relief sought. Accordingly, the petition for writ of mandamus is DENIED. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(a). Any pending motions are denied as moot.
PER CURIAM
Do not publish.
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
Memorandum Opinion delivered and
filed this 11th day of September, 2007.
1. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(d) ("When denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not required to do so."); Tex. R. App. P. 47.4 (distinguishing opinions and memorandum opinions).
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